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Objective: This paper aims to explore the role of 
factors pertaining to trust in real-world automation 
systems through the application of observational meth-
ods in a case study from the railway sector.
Background: Trust in automation is widely 
acknowledged as an important mediator of automation 
use, but the majority of the research on automation 
trust is based on laboratory work. In contrast, this 
work explored trust in a real-world setting.
Method: Experienced rail operators in four signal-
ing centers were observed for 90 min, and their activities 
were coded into five mutually exclusive categories. Their 
observed activities were analyzed in relation to their 
reported trust levels, collected via a questionnaire.
Results: The results showed clear differences in 
activity, even when circumstances on the worksta-
tions were very similar, and significant differences in 
some trust dimensions were found between groups 
exhibiting different levels of intervention and time not 
involved with signaling.
Conclusion: Although the empirical, lab-based 
studies in the literature have consistently found that 
reliability and competence of the automation are the 
most important aspects of trust development, under-
standing of the automation emerged as the strongest 
dimension in this study. The implications are that 
development and maintenance of trust in real-world, 
safety-critical automation systems may be distinct from 
artificial laboratory automation.
Application: The findings have important impli-
cations for emerging automation concepts in diverse 
industries including highly automated vehicles and 
Internet of things.
Keywords: human-automation interaction, supervi-
sory control, technology acceptance, trust in automa-
tion, ethnographic observations
IntroductIon
Automation is becoming increasingly per-
vasive, and there is an urgent need to learn 
lessons from well-established highly automated 
systems in order to influence the design of new 
forms and applications of automation. This 
paper explores the role of factors pertaining to 
trust in real-world automation systems, apply-
ing observational methods in a case study from 
the railway sector to relate automation use to 
reported trust. The system under investigation is 
an advanced automated control system that has 
been successfully operating on portions of the 
UK rail system for several decades. Trust has 
been identified as a potentially important con-
struct in relation to automation by researchers 
who theorize that low levels of trust in automa-
tion may influence operators’ usage (e.g., Muir, 
1987; Sheridan, 1999). Muir (1994) stated that 
if it was not possible to build automated systems 
that are trustworthy, then we could not build 
automated systems at all, and several studies 
have found a correlation between trust levels 
and use of automated systems (e.g., de-Vries, 
Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003; Lewandowsky, 
Mundy, & Tan, 2000; Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 
2000; Muir & Moray, 1989). Typically these 
studies find that operators use automation only 
to the extent that they trust it; if operators dis-
trust automation they will reject it, preferring 
to perform the task manually. However, almost 
all these experiments were laboratory based, 
utilizing simulations of work environments and 
whether these results transfer to real work 
environments is still an open question—but an 
important one given the increasing levels of 
automation in the workplace.
The work of both Barber (1983) and Rempel, 
Holmes, and Zanna (1985) forms the most com-
mon basis for a definition of trust in relation to 
human-automation interaction. These defini-
tions were originally developed to represent 
interpersonal trust but have been commonly 
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adapted to define human-automation trust (Mad-
havan & Wiegmann, 2007). Both are three-stage 
definitions and can be regarded as somewhat 
overlapping. The first stage involves the cre-
ation of an accurate mental model that allows 
the operator to understand and predict the behav-
ior of the system (Muir, 1987). This implies that 
trust is dependent upon understanding of the 
system (Lee, 1991). The second stage concerns 
the ability of the system to correctly perform its 
tasks and is frequently regarded as the most 
important for human-automation trust (Muir, 
1987). This might also be called reliability or 
competence and refers to the performance of the 
system (Lee, 1991). Barber identified three 
types of technical competence that one human 
might expect from another: expert knowledge, 
technical facility, and everyday routine perfor-
mance. Automation may be capable of carrying 
out only one of these three factors but still be 
able to perform its individual task satisfactorily. 
The final dimension can be labeled faith and 
becomes important when the automation is more 
competent than the human operator. The opera-
tor is therefore unable to evaluate the automa-
tion and must rely on an assessment of the auto-
mation’s responsibility. Several researchers have 
examined the factors influencing trust, and these 
are summarized in two studies (Hoff and Bashir, 
2015; Schaefer et al., 2014). Both suggest that 
trust is influenced by three sources: The first is 
related to the individual, including his or her 
personality, background, attitudes, and capabili-
ties, and can be labeled dispositional trust. The 
second relates to the situation or environment, 
including the complexity of the task and the 
operator workload, and can be labeled situa-
tional trust. The third relates to the automation 
itself, including its behavior, reliability, trans-
parency, and performance, and can be labeled 
learned trust.
The foregoing definitions suggest that trust is 
a multidimensional concept and that there are 
many factors that can influence an operator’s 
trust in an automated system. Research, much of 
it using a pasteurization plant simulation, has 
consistently shown that automation reliability is 
closely related to operator trust (Lee & Moray, 
1994; Muir & Moray, 1989; Wiegmann, Rich, & 
Zhang, 2001). In fact, there are two facets to 
reliability; an automated system may be reliable 
in the sense that it does not suffer mechanical 
failure, but it must also be reliable in the sense of 
making correct decisions consistently or per-
forming its function well. This second facet can 
be labeled “competence” for clarity (Madsen & 
Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996; Parasura-
man, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). System com-
petence has been found to be the greatest predic-
tor of the operator’s overall trust (Muir & Moray, 
1989), and operator trust may be affected differ-
ently by different levels of system incompe-
tence. Small errors, even those that do not affect 
performance, may greatly reduce trust, whereas 
operators have been found to become increas-
ingly less sensitive to larger errors (Lee & 
Moray, 1992; Muir & Moray, 1996). Automa-
tion must therefore be extremely reliable if high 
levels of trust and usage are to be achieved; 
Wickens and Dixon (2007), in a meta-analysis, 
found that less than 70% reliability of automa-
tion is worse than useless.
Such research highlights the importance of 
highly reliable and competent automation; how-
ever, operators may perceive even unreliable 
automation to be better than manual operation. 
Riley (1996) suggested that operators’ trust in, 
or decision to rely on, automation is strongly 
influenced by the operators’ self-confidence. If 
an operator has more confidence in his or her 
own abilities than in the automation, then he or 
she is more likely to perform the task manually, 
and research using the pasteurization plant sim-
ulation has confirmed this relationship (Lee & 
Moray, 1992, 1994). Participants used the auto-
mated system when conditions became such that 
they could not manage the system manually 
(e.g., during faults). Despite the low reliability, 
the automation became useful to the operator 
(Sheridan, 1999). The type of automation error 
and the consequences of that error also influence 
usage (Jiang et al., 2004); for example, if the auto-
mation makes an incorrect decision that causes 
further problems for an already overloaded opera-
tor, the operator is more likely to discontinue using 
the automation. The interplay between compe-
tence, usefulness, and self-confidence may be 
quite complex, but to ensure automation is use-
ful and utilized, the literature is clear that the 
first requirement is reliability, both in the sense 
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of repeated consistent functioning and compe-
tent decision making.
Safety-critical systems are likely to be highly 
reliable and competent, and operators highly 
trained and confident in their abilities, and in 
these cases other factors may influence trust. 
Feedback from the automation, and its transpar-
ency, becomes particularly important as automa-
tion becomes more complex and possibly even 
exceeds operator competence. Operators require 
explicit and appropriate feedback about its 
intentions in order to develop appropriate expec-
tations (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997; Sheri-
dan, 1999). Good feedback may even counter 
the loss of trust in automation with low reliabil-
ity and increase automation use. Research has 
shown that if operators are given an explanation 
as to why the automation might err then trust 
and usage levels can be maintained (Beck, 
Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2007; Dzindolet, Peterson, 
Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). Simpler auto-
mation systems may not require advanced levels 
of feedback as the operator may be capable of 
understanding and predicting the automation 
without such prompts. It is the ability to develop 
an accurate mental model (see Wilson & Ruther-
ford, 1989, for a description of mental models) 
that the operator can use to understand and accu-
rately predict future behavior of the system that 
facilitates trust (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & 
Moray, 1996; Sheridan, 1999). Wickens (1992) 
stated that successful performance in control 
rooms depends on a good mental model of the 
system, allowing operators to anticipate future 
system states, formulate plans, and troubleshoot 
effectively, and poor or inaccurate mental mod-
els have been associated with incidents and acci-
dents (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2006). Opera-
tors who possess accurate mental models can 
make correct judgments about when an auto-
mated system can be relied on and when it 
should not be relied on. This is referred to as 
trust calibration.
Calibration of trust refers to the correspon-
dence between a person’s trust in the automation 
and the automation capabilities (Lee & See, 
2004; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). If trust is 
miscalibrated, the result is inappropriate reliance 
on the automation, either overtrust or undertrust. 
For a system to work optimally, the operator’s 
level of trust in the automation must be correctly 
calibrated (i.e., it should match the actual capa-
bilities of the automation). These capabilities 
may vary in different circumstances; for exam-
ple, automation may be competent in one set of 
circumstances but not in another. Operators 
should be able to recognize when automation 
can be relied upon and when it cannot. However, 
trust is not always uniform between different 
operators. Preexisting factors such as experience 
with technology and familiarity may influence 
operator trust (Sheridan, 1999), meaning that 
individuals may have different trust levels for 
the same automated system. Merritt and Ilgen 
(2008) found that individual differences did 
affect perceptions of automation competence 
and hence influenced trust. Interestingly, they 
also found that individuals who had higher 
expectations of and a propensity to trust automa-
tion had the largest negative impact on trust 
when the automation failed. This suggests that 
correct calibration, and optimal automation 
usage, for less than perfectly reliable automation 
may more likely be achieved by individuals who 
are not predisposed to trust the automation.
The vast majority of the research on trust 
between humans and automated systems has been 
conducted in lab-based studies, with compara-
tively little known about how the research find-
ings transfer to real systems. Hoffman, Johnson, 
and Bradshaw (2013) highlight that much of the 
research into trust between humans and automa-
tion has involved small-world studies using simu-
lation and college students as participants, and 
they caution that these results do not necessarily 
generalize. There exist some fundamental reasons 
why lab findings may not be representative of 
actual operations. For example, lab studies use 
novice participants who have limited understand-
ing of the domain of application and limited expo-
sure to the specific system under study. Some 
aspects of trust may take time to develop—time 
that is not available in lab experiments. Incentives 
for participants in lab studies are necessarily a 
proxy for real-world incentives and may result in 
different behaviors. Lab studies also typically 
examine the use of automation as either all or 
nothing, on or off. This is possibly due to the 
nature of the automated systems used in the exper-
iments, which do not allow participants to simply 
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intervene to force a decision; however, this 
approach is possible with some real-world auto-
mation systems, including that studied in this 
work. Some real-world studies do exist, such as 
that reported by Lyons, Ho, et al. (2016) into test 
pilot trust in a prototype collision avoidance sys-
tem. This qualitative study found that the false 
alarm rate, system performance, transparency, and 
familiarity with the flight maneuver all influenced 
pilots’ trust in the system. However, the degree to 
which this influences their interactions with the 
automation was not studied. The study reported in 
this paper aimed to investigate the relationship 
between trust and automation use in a real-world 
railway-signaling system through the measure-
ment of reported trust via a questionnaire and 
observations of automation usage.
Trust is a multidimensional concept and is 
difficult to measure as it is dependent on circum-
stances, features of the automation, and individ-
ual differences. There is no direct objective mea-
surement of trust, so measurement tends to 
depend on subjective ratings on the dimensions 
believed to influence trust, including reliability, 
competence, understandability, faith, personal 
attachment, and deception (Atoyan, Duquet, & 
Robert, 2006; Bisantz & Seong, 2001; Jian, 
Bisantz, & Drury, 2000; Madsen & Gregor, 
2000). Reliability and competence of the auto-
mation are known to be fundamental require-
ments in the development of trust (Muir & 
Moray, 1989; Wiegmann et al., 2001), but as 
signaling systems are safety critical, the automa-
tion is required to be highly reliable. It may be 
expected, therefore, that other dimensions in the 
development of trust may emerge, some of 
which may not have as strong an empirical basis 
in the research. These include feedback (Sarter 
et al., 1997), understandability and predictability 
(Sheridan, 2002), and faith (Muir, 1987).
The following key dimensions were identi-
fied from the literature to be included in the 
measurement of factors pertaining to trust:
 • reliability—in terms of both mechanical reliabil-
ity and consistent functioning over time (Madsen 
& Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996; Sheridan, 
1999);
 • robustness—the ability to function under a variety 
of circumstances (Sheridan, 1999; Woods, 1996);
 • understandability—the ability to understand what 
the automation is doing, why it is doing it, and 
how it is doing it (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Sheri-
dan, 1999);
 • competence—the perceived ability of the automa-
tion to perform its tasks (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; 
Muir & Moray, 1996);
 • feedback—the ability of the automation to explic-
itly give feedback on its intended actions (Nor-
man, 1990; Sheridan, 1999);
 • dependability—the extent to which the auto-
mation can be counted on to do its job (Muir & 
Moray, 1996; Rempel et al., 1985);
 • personal attachment—the extent to which opera-
tors like to use the automation (Madsen & Gregor, 
2000);
 • predictability—the ability of the operator to pre-
dict the actions of the automation (Muir, 1994; 
Rempel et al., 1985); and
 • faith—the extent of belief that the automation will 
be able to cope with future system states that it 
may not yet have encountered (Madsen & Gregor, 
2000; Muir, 1994; Rempel et al., 1985).
overvIew of case study
Railway signaling control is a critical aspect 
of railway operations, with responsibility for 
safely and efficiently implementing the paths 
of trains through the network. Signaling sys-
tems have evolved from direct manual control 
of small sections of the railway developed 
in the 1800s to computerized systems featur-
ing advanced automation in the past couple 
of decades. See Balfe, Wilson, Sharples, and 
Clarke (2007) for more information about the 
different generations of signaling systems and 
a description of the varying levels of automa-
tion present. The research presented in this 
paper examines individual differences in trust 
when using the Automated Route Setting (ARS) 
system.
ARS is a fully automated signaling control 
system, capable of running all timetabled train 
services under normal operations. It uses time-
table information to set routes for trains and 
incorporates algorithms to make decisions about 
the prioritization of trains running late. It essen-
tially operates as an invisible operator, setting 
routes for trains as they traverse the workstation. 
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See Balfe, Sharples, & Wilson (2015) for more 
details on ARS functionality. The human opera-
tors (signalers) are responsible for monitoring 
the automation and ensuring that the correct 
routes are set for trains at the correct time and in 
the correct order. Their aim is to minimize delay, 
and they also may have some tasks to complete 
that are outside ARS’s capabilities, but these are 
relatively few during normal operations. ARS 
does not give an indication of which route it will 
set, so signalers rely on their experience and 
knowledge of the system to choose when to 
intervene. They can choose to fully disable the 
automation, but they also have the option to 
work alongside the automation by disabling the 
automation over a particular section of the track 
and/or setting routes before it has the opportu-
nity. Previous research (Balfe, Wilson, Sharples, 
& Clarke, 2012) has established that turning off 
the automation entirely is relatively rare and 
generally occurs only during extreme disrup-
tion, but interventions to constrain or force deci-
sions are common. Thus, the automation and the 
signalers usually work in parallel, with ARS’s 
setting the majority of the routes and the opera-
tors’ monitoring the automation and making 
brief interventions when they deem it necessary. 
These interventions therefore represent a disuse 
of the automation by the signaler.
The aim of the study was to develop and apply 
a methodology for observing signalers at their 
workstations and to relate the observed activities 
to reported levels of trust. This methodology was 
applied in pursuit of the following objectives:
1. to determine what proportion of signalers’ time 
is spent monitoring, controlling, planning, com-
municating, or not actively involved in signaling 
during normal operations;
2. to establish whether factors pertaining to trust are 
related to how often the signaler intervenes and 
their level of monitoring; and
3. to investigate whether the effects between trust 
and automation usage found in laboratory studies 
and documented in the literature are applicable 
with real-world automation systems.
Method
The research applied an observational method 
to collect data on signaler activity (Method 1), 
and trust was measured via a questionnaire 
(Method 2). This research complied with the 
University of Nottingham’s ethics code and 
was approved by the ethical review board at the 
university. Informed consent was obtained from 
each participant.
observational Method
A coding scheme was developed to support 
the manual real time observations in the field. 
Five basic codes were used:
 • monitoring,
 • intervening,
 • planning,
 • communicating, and
 • quiet time.
A sixth supplementary code (closed-circuit tele-
vision [CCTV]) was added for one of the signal 
boxes included in the study. It is important to 
note that monitoring was coded when it was the 
only activity in which the signaler was engaged. 
Within these five categories, additional subcate-
gories were coded. These are described in Table 1. 
We might expect that signalers with lower trust 
would engage in higher levels of monitoring in 
anticipation of having to intervene, higher inter-
vention levels, and lower levels of quiet time 
as they do not trust the automation to continue 
unsupervised.
The coding scheme was tested in a pilot study 
to ensure that the codes were exhaustive and that 
it was possible to easily differentiate between 
the behaviors. The basic coding scheme worked 
well during the pilot, but a major finding was the 
existence of different levels of monitoring 
behavior. The signaler’s position was observed 
to change substantially during the monitoring 
task, and during the pilot study five levels were 
identified. The highest level had the signaler sit-
ting up and watching the screens intently with 
his or her hand on the trackerball and was very 
common when the signaler was waiting for the 
right moment to intervene. In the next level the 
signaler again was sitting up with his or her hand 
still on the trackerball but scanning the screens 
rather than watching one spot intently. This 
monitoring appeared to be associated with situa-
tions where the signaler felt it was likely he or 
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she may have to intervene but had not yet 
decided where. The next level was similar, but 
the signaler did not have his or her hand on the 
trackerball. This was inferred to be pure infor-
mation gathering monitoring behavior. It was 
often seen when the signaler was preparing to 
leave the desk, had just returned, or immediately 
after an intervention. The next type of monitor-
ing behavior identified was passive monitoring; 
the signaler was sitting back, but it was clear 
from his or her movements and posture that he 
or she was watching what was happening on the 
screens. The final type of monitoring behavior 
seen during the pilot was complete passive 
TABle 1: Observation Coding Scheme
Main Code Subcode Description
Monitoring Active monitoring Monitoring was coded as active if the signaler was sitting up 
while monitoring.
Passive monitoring Monitoring was coded as passive if the signaler was sitting 
back while monitoring.
Intervention Trackerball Trackerball usage was noted only if the signaler used the 
button (i.e., simply moving the cursor with no resulting 
intervention was coded as active monitoring).
Keyboard Use of the keyboard attached to the automation system 
only was classified under this heading. Other systems on 
the workstation also had keyboards, but use of these was 
classified as planning behavior.
Planning Planning Any reference to planning tools included paper versions of 
the timetable for the area and computer systems showing 
current train delays in the area.
Communications Telephone Any telephone or intercom calls were classified under this 
heading.
Voice comms Communications with the signaler on an adjacent workstation 
or the shift manager were classified under this heading. Only 
information that was relevant to the immediate signaling 
situation was thus classified. Conversations regarding, for 
example, situations that occurred in the past were coded 
as quiet time as they would not have been relevant to the 
signaling at that time.
Quiet time Quiet time This included any time when the signaler was involved in an 
activity not directly related to signaling. Conversations with 
other signalers or staff, conversations with the researcher, 
and reading newspapers or magazines were all examples of 
activities classed as quiet time.
Signaler away from 
workstation
Signalers occasionally took time away from the workstation, 
for a variety of reasons but most commonly to make a cup of 
tea. If the workstation was left unattended this activity was 
classed as quiet time away from the workstation.
CCTV CCTV Only one of the sites had CCTV screens on the workstations. 
These screens are used to monitor and operate level 
crossings. When the signaler was involved in either 
monitoring or operating these, CCTV was coded.
Note. CCTV = closed-circuit television.
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monitoring. Often the signaler put his or her 
hands behind the head, and it was not possible to 
tell if he or she was even focusing on the screens. 
Although these five levels were clearly observed 
during the pilot study, to attempt to code these 
for all observed signalers subsequently would 
have greatly complicated the observer’s task. 
Therefore, a decision was made to differentiate 
between only active and passive monitoring in 
subsequent observations. Pan, Gillies, and Slater 
(2008) stated that body movement is an easily 
observable indicator of a person’s state. Cues in 
the posture and behavior of signalers were used 
to infer whether they were engaging in active or 
passive monitoring.
The interrater reliability of the method was 
tested and, after second researcher training and 
familiarization, was found to generate an 80% 
proportion of agreement and a Cohen’s Kappa 
of 65%, representing good agreement.
Questionnaire Method
A questionnaire was administered to gather 
data on factors pertaining to signalers’ trust 
in the automation. Statements for each of the 
key dimensions identified in the literature were 
taken from previously validated questionnaires 
(Bisantz & Seong, 2001; Jian et al., 2000; Mad-
sen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996), and 
a five-point Likert-type scale (from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree) was applied to each 
statement. The statements were slightly modi-
fied to suit the signaling environment, and a 
final statement—“I trust ARS”—was included 
to gauge overall trust in the system. The 19 
statements on the questionnaire are shown in 
Table 2.
study design
Eight workstations in four signaling centers 
were included in the study. Workstations A in 
each signal box were comparable in terms of 
workload and the type of demands placed on the 
signalers. Workstations B were similarly chosen 
to be comparable to each other. The signaling 
centers chosen for the study were picked on 
the basis of the reported usage of ARS in each. 
Usage is reportedly low in Signaling Center 1, 
TABle 2: Questionnaire Statements
 1. ARS is always available for use (Mechanical Reliability).
 2. ARS is capable of performing under a variety of different circumstances (Robustness).
 3. It is easy to understand what ARS does (Understandability 1).
 4. ARS is capable of signaling trains as competently as a signaler (Competence 1).
 5. ARS gives explicit information on its intended actions (Feedback).
 6. I can count on ARS to do its job (Dependability).
 7. I have a personal preference for using ARS (Personal Attachment).
 8. I can predict what ARS will do from moment to moment (Predictability 1).
 9.  If ARS makes a routing decision which I am uncertain about I have confidence that ARS is  
correct (Faith 1).
10. I understand how ARS works (Understandability 2).
11. ARS performs well under normal running conditions (Competence 2).
12. ARS is very unpredictable, I never know what it is going to do (Predictability 2).
13. I can rely on ARS to function as it is supposed to (Reliability 2).
14.  Even if I have no reason to expect that ARS will be able to deal with a situation, I still feel certain 
that it will (Faith 2).
15. I understand why ARS makes the decisions it does (Understandability 3).
16. ARS performs well under disturbed conditions (Competence 3).
17. ARS is very consistent (Predictability 3).
18. ARS will always make the same routing decision under the same circumstances (Reliability 2).
19. I trust ARS (Overall trust).
Note. ARS = Automated Route Setting.
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high in Signaling Center 2, and variable in Sig-
naling Centers 3 and 4. Figure 1 describes the 
workstations involved in the study.
Complexity of workstations was measured 
using Operational Demand Evaluation Checklist 
(ODEC) scores and verified by subject matter 
experts. The ODEC tool was developed to mea-
sure the demand placed upon the signaler due to 
the infrastructure on a particular workstation 
(Pickup, Wilson, & Lowe, 2010). The tool mea-
sures quantifiable aspects of the workstation such 
as number of signals, number of level crossings, 
and speeds of trains and then ranks each entity as 
high, medium, or low. Visits were undertaken and 
data collected to complete ODECs for all worksta-
tions in the four signaling centers and, in order for 
the study to be comparable, the ODEC scores 
were matched as closely as possible for the work-
stations chosen for the study so the workstations 
were as similar as possible. In addition, subject 
matter experts were consulted to ensure that the 
specific demands of the chosen workstations were 
comparable; for example, the four workstations in 
Group A have high traffic levels through station 
areas whereas the four in Group B have a depot. 
Although every effort was made to make the 
workstations in the study as comparable as possi-
ble, there are no two areas on the railway that pre-
cisely match, and this variability must be accepted 
as a limitation of the study.
data collection
Opportunity sampling was used for this 
study. Signalers were not specifically chosen for 
the study; the decision was based purely on who 
was working on the workstations of interest on 
the days planned for data collection and whether 
they were willing to take part in the study. On 
three occasions the same signaler was observed 
twice, but these repeated observations occurred 
by chance. Therefore, the total number of par-
ticipants was 21 across 24 observations in total. 
All participants were male and had a minimum 
of 5 years’ signaling experience using ARS.
The observations were carried out at the same 
time of day on each workstation. The observa-
tion time was 4:30–6:00 p.m. The researcher 
arrived at the signaling center at approximately 
4:00 p.m. and approached the signaler on the 
workstation of interest. Usually the signaler had 
been made aware of the study in advance to 
ensure he was happy with being observed, but in 
some cases this was not possible, and a brief out-
line of the study was required before proceed-
ing. The study was then explained in more detail, 
and the signaler was given a consent form to 
read through and sign. Following this, the 
researcher asked about the current state of the 
area under the signaler’s control and whether 
there were any particular problems. Any 
instances of disruption or late-running trains 
Obs1
W/S A W/S B
Signaling Center 1
Obs2 Obs3 Obs4 Obs5 Obs6 Obs7
W/S A W/S B
Signaling Center 2
Obs8 Obs9 Obs10 Obs11 Obs12
W/S B
Signaling Center 3
Obs16 Obs17 Obs18
W/S B
Obs13 Obs14 Obs15
W/S B
Signaling Center 4
Obs22 Obs23 Obs24
W/S B
Obs19 Obs20 Obs21
Figure 1. Study design.
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were noted. Once everything was explained sat-
isfactorily, the signaler was instructed to ignore 
the researcher as much as possible and to act as 
if she were not there. Once data collection com-
menced, signaler activity was coded every 5 s 
using the coding system outlined earlier.
At the end of the observation period, par-
ticipants were given the questionnaire and 
asked to rate their agreement with each state-
ment on a five-point Likert-type scale. They 
were also asked to give a short debrief on any 
unusual occurrences on the workstation during 
the observation. Finally, they were asked their 
most common reason for intervening during 
the observation and which intervention method 
they favored.
results
observation results
Figure 2 describes the results of the obser-
vations. Each bar on the graph describes the 
distribution of activity for one signaler, and 
each group of three bars describes the three 
observations for each workstation in the study. 
There are clear differences in activity between 
signalers. The same signaler was observed on 
Observation 3 and Observation 4, and these two 
graphs are remarkably similar. Observation 8 
and Observation 11 also show the same signaler, 
but these graphs are different. In this case there 
was disruption during Observation 11 that con-
tributed to the difference in the graphs. Finally, 
the same signaler was observed for Observation 
23 and Observation 24, but these graphs show a 
big difference, particularly in intervention. It is 
not possible to account for this difference as the 
observations took place on the same workstation 
that was reportedly running smoothly on both 
days. The signaler on Observation 17 was the 
only one to choose not to use ARS.
Table 3 describes the average time dedicated to 
each behavior for each workstation in the study. 
The standard deviation also is given, and the high 
values for these illustrate the variability of the data 
on workstations. There is also considerable varia-
tion across control centers and workstations due to 
the differences in timetabled traffic and infrastruc-
ture in different geographical locations. This vari-
ability could not be controlled; however, the dif-
ferences within workstations can be ascribed to 
individual differences as the traffic levels were 
identical for each observation.
The circumstances on the workstations during 
the observations were recorded. Out of the 24 
observations, 13 had entirely smooth running with 
no problems whatsoever, 8 had minor problems 
that the signalers stated had little or no effect on 
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their work, and 3 had more major infrastructure 
problems that had a slight effect on their work 
(Observations 1, 9, and 11). These 3 observations 
were examined, and the graph shows that the 3 
observations with some disruption did not have 
the highest monitoring or intervention levels. It is 
likely that the disruption would have had some 
effect on the observed behavior of the signaler, but 
that effect was not large enough for these observa-
tions to be prominent.
Monitoring
The mean percentage of time spent monitor-
ing was 48%, a maximum of 73% and a mini-
mum of 16% of the total 90-min observation. 
Two types of monitoring behavior were identi-
fied as a result of the pilot study and were coded 
during the remainder of the studies: active 
monitoring and passive monitoring. Passive 
monitoring was typically carried out for longer 
periods of time than active monitoring; the aver-
age length of time spent passively monitoring 
was 27 s, and the average length of time spent 
actively monitoring was 13 s. The proportion 
of passive monitoring was higher than that of 
active monitoring, with means of 27% and 21% 
of total time, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the average level of active 
and passive monitoring observed on each work-
station in the study. The standard deviation is 
also shown, and the high standard deviation val-
ues suggest that the individual rather than the 
workstation drives the monitoring level. As the 
observations were carried out at the same time 
of day, the traffic encountered should have been 
very nearly identical. Although some of the 
workstations do show comparable monitoring 
levels (e.g., Observation 5 and Observation 6; 
see Figure 2), in light of the other data gathered 
it is likely that this is a coincidence.
Intervention
The average percentage of time spent interven-
ing during the course of an observation was 9%, 
the maximum was 19%, and the minimum was 
1%. Two types of intervention were coded: use 
of the trackerball and use of the keyboard. The 
trackerball allows the signaler to set routes and 
other directive activities. These activities also can 
be achieved through the keyboard, but the key-
board also may be used to query ARS or to look 
up timetable information. Use of the trackerball 
was considerably higher than use of the keyboard. 
The average time for an intervention with the 
TABle 3: Average Percentage Occupancy and Standard Deviation per Workstation
Monitoring Intervention Planning Communications
Quiet 
Time
Closed-Circuit 
Television
Center 1
Workstation A
34 (8) 9 (4) 16 (1) 13 (7) 27 (19) NA
Center 1
Workstation B
49 (6) 12 (2) 17 (3) 11 (5) 10 (3) NA
Center 2
Workstation A
35 (19) 4 (3) 10 (8) 6 (2) 45 (24) NA
Center 2
Workstation B
47 (19) 13 (6) 11 (4) 8 (4) 21 (17) NA
Center 3
Workstation A
57 (10) 11 (3) 8 (2) 4 (2) 20 (4) NA
Center 3
Workstation B
50 (19) 8 (3) 6 (3) 8 (5) 29 (24) NA
Center 4
Workstation A
46 (10) 6 (2) 17 (7) 10 (4) 14 (9) 7 (3)
Center 4
Workstation B
65 (7) 10 (6) 4 (1) 2 (2) 13 (10) 6 (2)
Note. NA = not applicable.
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trackerball (8 s) was only slightly longer than that 
for keyboard interventions (6 s). Overall, use of 
the keyboard was very low compared with use of 
the trackerball, but use was highest in Signaling 
Center 1 (Observations 1–6).
Figure 4 shows the mean and standard devia-
tion of trackerball and keyboard use for each 
workstation in the study. Similar to monitoring, 
intervention levels differed greatly between 
individuals, as can be seen by the high standard 
deviation for trackerball use. Since the three 
observations for each workstation were con-
ducted at the same time of day, the train-running 
pattern should have been almost identical, and 
thus the workload and tasks encountered should 
have been very similar. An increase could be 
seen on workstations that experienced incidents 
during the course of the observation, but even 
then these were not the highest observed levels 
of intervention.
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Quiet time
The average percentage of overall quiet 
time during the observations was 22%, with a 
maximum of 66% and a minimum of 4%. Two 
types of quiet time were coded: time spent at the 
workstation not actively involved in signaling 
and time spent away from the workstation. Indi-
vidual quiet periods at the workstation lasted 
for an average of 20 s, compared with 1 min for 
periods away from the workstation. The longest 
quiet period spent at the desk without monitor-
ing or engaging in any other signaling activity 
was 4 min, 35 s, but this was an unusually long 
time; the next highest time was 2 min, 55 s. As 
can be seen in Figure 5, quiet time at the work-
station was considerably more common than 
quiet time away from the workstation. The lon-
gest time spent away from the workstation by 
any of the observed signalers was 2 min, 55 s.
other activities
Automation was not expected to influence 
planning, communications, or CCTV activities 
during these observations. Communications are 
typically associated with disruption or failures, 
which did not occur during these observations. 
Planning is typically related to finding timetable 
information for approaching trains in a system 
unrelated to ARS, and CCTV is an entirely 
manual activity that has no relation to ARS. The 
results for these three activities are presented 
here briefly. The average percentage of total 
time spent occupied with planning activities 
was 11.3%, with a maximum of 23.2% and a 
minimum of 2.6%. Different centers tended to 
use different planning tools, but discussion of 
these differences is outside the scope of this 
study. The average percentage of time overall 
spent on communications was 7.8%, with a 
maximum of 20.7% and a minimum of 0.4%. 
The average time of an individual telephone 
call was 28 s, whereas conversations with other 
signalers on adjacent workstations were 9 s on 
average. CCTV screens required to operate level 
crossings were present only on the workstations 
in Signaling Center 4. Signalers were required 
to lower the barriers for each train and confirm 
that the crossing was clear for trains to pass. 
This occupied a reasonable chunk of the signal-
ers’ time on these workstations, between 3% and 
9% of the total observation time.
trust results
The results of the questionnaires examining 
factors pertaining to each signaler’s perceived 
trust in the automation are described in this 
section. Although there were 24 observations, 3 
signalers were observed twice but completed the 
questionnaire after only 1 observation. There-
fore, there were 21 questionnaire respondents. 
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The results of the questionnaire are shown in 
Figure 6.
statistical analysis
In order to analyze further the results of the 
questionnaires, the signalers observed were 
divided into groups of high, medium, and low 
in terms of monitoring, intervention, and quiet 
time. In order to offset differences in activity 
driven by individual workstations, the groups 
were constructed by comparing the relative dif-
ferences between the three signalers observed 
on each workstation. Planning, communica-
tions, and CCTV were not analyzed, as levels 
for these were likely to be affected by factors 
outside of the signalers’ direct control and not 
relevant to the central question of trust in auto-
mation. Table 4 shows the numbers of signalers 
assigned to the low, medium, and high groups 
for each of the three analyzed activities.
Each observation was compared to the other 
two observations on the same workstation to deter-
mine the groupings. Two observations (Observa-
tion 1 and Observation 9) were excluded from this 
part of the study because there was significant dis-
ruption on these workstations during the observa-
tions, and this may have affected the observed lev-
els of each activity. These exclusions were in addi-
tion to Observation 3, Observation 11, and 
Observation 23, which were omitted as the signaler 
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Figure 6. Trust questionnaire results.
TABle 4: Numbers of Signalers Assigned to Low, 
Medium, and High Groups
Group Monitoring Intervention Quiet Time
Low 8 8 7
Medium 5 6 5
High 6 5 7
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in each of these had already been observed and 
therefore had previously completed the trust ques-
tionnaire. The sample size was therefore 19. As 
data gathered using Likert-type scales can be 
regarded as pseudo-interval data (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007), t tests were run between the high and 
low groups in each category to test for significant 
differences between the two groups, with higher 
levels of trust hypothesized for the low monitoring 
and intervention and high quiet time groups.
No differences were found in terms of moni-
toring, and the null hypothesis was accepted for 
monitoring, but a number of differences were 
found in terms of intervention (see Figure 7):
 • Feedback—“ARS gives explicit information on 
its intended actions,” t(11) = 2.385, p < .05. The 
low intervention group was more likely to agree 
with this statement.
 • Understandability 2—“I understand how ARS 
works,” t(11) = 2.851, p < .05. The low intervention 
group was more likely to agree with this statement.
 • Predictability 2—“ARS is very unpredictable; I 
never know what it is going to do,” t(11) = –2.337, 
p < .05. The high intervention group was more 
likely to agree with this statement.
 • Reliability 1—“I can rely on ARS to function as 
it is supposed to,” t(11) = 2.434, p < .05. The low 
intervention group was more likely to agree with 
this statement.
 • Faith 2—“Even if I have no reason to expect that 
ARS will be able to deal with a situation, I still 
feel certain that it will,” t(10) = 2.373, p < .05. The 
low intervention group was more likely to agree 
with this statement.
 • Understandability 3—“I understand why ARS 
makes the decisions it does,” t(11) = 2.782, p < 
.05. The low intervention group was more likely 
to agree with this statement.
 • Overall trust—“I trust ARS,” t(11) = 2.478, p < 
.05. The low intervention group was more likely 
to agree with this statement.
A difference was found between the groups for 
the overall understandability dimension, t(11) = 
2.571, p < .05, with the low intervention group rat-
ing its understanding of the automation higher.
Two significant differences were found 
between signalers engaging in high and low lev-
els of quiet time (see Figure 8):
 • Understandability 1—“It is easy to understand 
what ARS does,” t(12) = –2.178, p < .05. Signal-
ers displaying high levels of quiet time were more 
likely to agree with this statement.
 • Faith 1—“If ARS makes a routing decision which 
I am uncertain about I have confidence that ARS 
is correct,” t(12) = –2.756, p < .05. Signalers dis-
playing high levels of quiet time were more likely 
to agree with this statement.
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Figure 7. Significant differences between intervention groups.
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dIscussIon
observed activities
Monitoring behavior showed considerable 
variation between observed signalers despite 
the observations on individual workstations 
experiencing similar conditions. It seems likely 
therefore that monitoring levels under normal 
running are driven by the individual rather than 
demand from the workstation.
Two types of monitoring were identified and 
coded during the study: active monitoring and 
passive monitoring. No reference to different 
states or levels of monitoring was found in the 
literature on automation. However, a similar 
concept arose in the discussion on differences 
between “active control” and “passive monitor-
ing” (Endsley & Kiris, 1995), where it was sug-
gested that automation induced passive process-
ing of information that was inferior to active. 
Both active and passive monitoring were fre-
quently engaged in throughout the study, but 
active monitoring was more common between 
interventions whereas passive monitoring was 
associated more with quiet time. It seems likely 
that rather than signalers’ working with automa-
tion constantly suffering from inferior informa-
tion processing as is suggested in the literature, 
they actually actively process information when 
they believe decisions may be required and 
engage in a more relaxed form of monitoring 
(passive monitoring) when they feel the demands 
of the workstation are lesser. Although it was 
not possible to determine how much attention 
the signaler paid during passive monitoring, 
there are frequent examples of interventions 
following a period of passive monitoring, so it 
can be concluded that information still is being 
processed. Cowan (1988) suggests that attention 
can be automatically triggered even during pas-
sive information-processing states. If this is the 
case, the use of different levels of monitoring 
behavior may be a very effective strategy for 
reducing workload associated with monitoring, 
which has been shown to be high (Warm, Dem-
ber, & Hancock, 1996), while still maintaining 
awareness of the system.
High levels of monitoring (either active or 
passive) were associated with low levels of quiet 
time, and low monitoring was associated with 
high levels of quiet time. This would seem to 
suggest that monitoring and quiet time are inter-
changeable and that signalers who can find a 
distraction (i.e., someone to talk to in most 
cases) will use some of the time otherwise used 
for monitoring purposes. There is probably a 
lower threshold of monitoring below which the 
signalers would feel uncomfortable, but further 
research would be required to identify what this 
might be. However, establishing that boundary 
would contribute to understanding the necessary 
levels of operator awareness of the system. The 
association of active monitoring with interven-
tions and passive monitoring with quiet time 
provides some validation of the decision to dif-
ferentiate between the two types of monitoring. 
More research is required to look at monitoring 
behaviors alone to identify what triggers each 
one and the quantity, quality, and type of infor-
mation gathered at each level. It is important to 
note that all observed signalers engaged in rou-
tine monitoring behavior, and the longest 
observed period when they were away from the 
workstation and could not monitor it was just 
less than 3 min. It would appear that monitoring 
is a critical ongoing activity for the signalers that 
they are not willing to neglect. This suggests that 
they place a high priority on maintaining aware-
ness of their control area, even when ARS is run-
ning all trains.
The results show a high degree of variation in 
intervention levels between signalers. Unfortu-
nately, it is not obvious from the data why some 
observations had higher intervention levels than 
others. It is clear that it is not totally due to par-
ticular circumstances on the workstation, as the 
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events experienced should have been very simi-
lar. This is a limitation of the observational 
method, which documents what happens but not 
why. For example, perhaps some signalers inter-
vened in advance and were thus able to deal with 
problems quite quickly, perhaps even making 
some interventions to prevent a situation’s 
developing, or some interventions may be more 
efficient than others. Therefore, like monitoring 
levels, intervention levels appear to be driven by 
the individual rather than the workstation, and 
research supports the theory that individual dif-
ferences may account for these differences 
(Merritt & Ilgen, 2008).
trust
Overall reported trust (Question 19) in the 
ARS system was neutral, with three strong dis-
agreements. Reliability was found to be relatively 
high, particularly in terms of mechanical reliabil-
ity or availability. The results were more varied 
for the related questions about competence, with 
participants’ universally agreeing that ARS per-
forms well under normal running conditions but 
strongly disagreeing that it works well under dis-
rupted (abnormal) conditions. The question about 
robustness, to which the responses were primarily 
negative, reinforces this view. The majority of 
participants also indicated that they considered 
ARS less competent than themselves. This indi-
cates both the confidence they have in their own 
abilities and their lack of confidence in the auto-
mation. It is interesting to note that their lack of 
confidence in ARS is not sufficient to fully disable 
the system, and this suggests that they view it as 
a useful aid but not one with the same capabilities 
as themselves. The impact of this relative lack 
of competence of the automation, particularly in 
degraded modes, on trust may not be very great; 
signalers may simply calibrate their trust accord-
ingly by developing a set of situations under which 
they trust ARS and assuming manual control or 
inhibiting the automation for other situations. The 
impact on workload is likely to be greater, with 
the automation offering the least support when 
the demands are greatest. The responses to the 
questions about understanding were largely posi-
tive, but the final question about why ARS makes 
the decisions it does scored lowest. This indicates 
that signalers may have a lesser understanding of 
why ARS makes certain decisions than of what it 
is doing and how it does it. The responses about 
predictability were more negative, and it appears 
that individuals’ perceived ability to predict the 
automation varies widely.
The results indicate that correlations can be 
found between the observed behaviors of signal-
ers and their reported trust in ARS, particularly in 
relation to the amount of time spent intervening. 
Although the sample size was small, the direction 
of the differences between groups all indicate that 
lower trust results in higher intervention, and the 
significant difference found in reported levels of 
overall trust and the high and low intervention 
groups provides some confidence that the method-
ology can distinguish between participants with 
varying levels of trust in the ARS system.
Differences were found in questions relating to 
feedback, understanding, predictability, reliability, 
and faith. Table 5 summarizes the dimensions on 
which significant differences were found between 
groups of high and low observed monitoring, 
intervention, and quiet time. Apart from research 
on reliability and feedback (Dzindolet et al., 2003; 
Wiegmann et al., 2001), no research is known to 
have found empirical evidence supporting the 
relationship of understanding, predictability, and 
faith to automation usage. Although the impor-
tance of developing understanding and accurate 
mental models and designing transparent automa-
tion (Chen et al., 2014; Lyons, Koltai, et al., 2016) 
is stated in much of the literature, the empirical 
research has focused largely on the reliability and 
competence dimensions of trust and suggests that 
TABle 5: Summary of Significant Differences 
Between Groups
Monitoring Intervention
Quiet 
Time
Reliability *  
Robustness  
Understanding 3* *
Competence  
Feedback *  
Dependability  
Attachment  
Predictability *  
Faith * *
Overall trust *  
Note. *indicates the number of significant differences 
found.
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these are the most critical in influencing automa-
tion usage. However, only one question out of six 
on these aspects (“I can rely on ARS to function as 
it is supposed to”) showed a difference between 
high and low levels of intervention, and no differ-
ence was found in terms of the competence ques-
tion. In real-world industrial systems, operator 
competence is developed through rigorous train-
ing and maintained through competence-manage-
ment systems, and this investment may negate the 
role of competence found in laboratory studies.
In this study, other dimensions of trust were 
more prominent. In particular, the ability to 
understand the automation showed significant 
differences in two of the three questions as well 
as across the group (i.e., the three significant 
differences indicated in Table 5). Feedback and 
predictability also showed significant differences 
between signalers exhibiting high and low levels 
of intervention. The results from this study sug-
gest that for application in real-world systems, 
future research should focus on the role of under-
standability in terms of both how it influences 
trust and automation usage and how it can be 
developed and supported. Safety-critical systems 
are always likely to be reliable, at least in a 
mechanical sense, whereas their competence is 
often dictated by the maturity of the technology 
and the constraints of the system being controlled. 
Feedback/transparency and understanding, lead-
ing to a greater ability to predict the automation, 
can both be facilitated through a variety of meth-
ods, including improved function allocation, 
innovative human-machine interface design, and 
thorough training. As automation increases in 
scope and complexity, the role of understanding 
is likely to become more critical.
The significant differences relating to under-
standing and faith between signalers exhibiting 
high and low levels of quiet time suggest that 
operators with a higher level of understanding and 
faith in the automation are more content to allow 
the automation to continue unmonitored as well as 
intervene less often. This may have important 
implications for operator complacency, particu-
larly in systems where there is a safety-critical ele-
ment to monitoring such as automated driving.
conclusIons
This study aimed to develop a method to 
investigate expert operator use of and trust in an 
advanced, real-world automated system under 
normal operational conditions. The combination 
of the observation method and questionnaire 
proved effective for addressing this aim and 
identifying differences between participants, 
particularly in terms of levels of intervention.
The study only partially replicated the find-
ings from the lab-based research documented in 
the literature, with understanding of the automa-
tion rather than reliability or competence emerg-
ing as the main differentiator between high and 
low levels of intervention among participants. 
On the basis of the results, we propose that 
understanding and feedback may be more rele-
vant for real-world safety-critical systems than 
reliability or competence and that operator trust 
in real-world automation may be fundamentally 
distinct from trust in laboratory automation. This 
has strong implications for future research on 
human interaction with automation systems and 
on the design of future automated systems, with 
the necessity of a renewed focus on improving 
automation feedback and greater investigation 
into the role and development of mental models 
in expert operators. This is particularly important 
in the development of new automation concepts, 
for example, in the automotive domains, and in 
extension of automation concepts, for example, 
through the Internet of things. However, the 
study was based in a single domain with a single 
automated system. Application of this methodol-
ogy in other well-established, highly automated 
domains is necessary to determine how general-
izable these results may be and to explore 
whether different domains and automated sys-
tems have different requirements.
This study also introduced the idea of differ-
ent levels of monitoring behavior and proposed 
that these may be an effective way for expert 
operators to regulate workload and effort. Fur-
ther research into this topic, for example, using 
eye-tracking and other physiological data col-
lection, would be extremely beneficial in sup-
porting operator interaction with the automated 
systems of the future.
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key PoInts
 • An observation methodology was developed and 
combined with a survey method to investigate 
trust in real-world automation use.
 • Different types of monitoring were observed, and it 
is suggested that these may be an effective way for 
expert operators to regulate workload and effort.
 • Understanding of the automation rather than 
reliability or competence emerged as the main 
differentiator between high and low levels of 
intervention among participants in this study.
 • Understanding and feedback may be more rel-
evant for real-world, safety-critical systems than 
reliability or competence, and operator trust in 
real-world automation may be fundamentally dis-
tinct from trust in laboratory automation.
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